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This study examines the earnings forecast accuracy of newly listed
companies on the Athens Stock Exchange and further investigates the
relationship between earnings forecast and pricing of IPOs. It uses a unique data
set of 208 IPOs, which were floated during the period of January 1994 to
December 2001 in the Athens Stock Exchange. The results suggest that
investors are able to anticipate forecast errors at the time of listing. Pricing of
IPOs indicate that firms with negative earnings forecast (pessimistic) are
associated with low level of underpricing while optimistic management earning
forecast can be a signal for high initial returns. Three variables – age of the
IPOs, ownership by insiders and industry classification significantly contribute
towards accuracy of earnings forecast.
Keywords: earnings forecast, IPO, accuracy of earnings, forecast error 
I.  Introduction
An important feature in the going public procedure is the prospectus, a
legal document that aims to reduce information asymmetries and inform
the investors on the financial status of newly listed firms. Initial public
offerings (IPOs) worldwide use prospectuses to publish financial
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forecasts (i.e. earnings, sales, expenses) based on their confidence in an
accurate prediction, bearing in mind the voluntarily/mandatory status
that depends on the country in which they want to go public. 
The study of management forecast accuracy can be instructive with
regards to several capital market issues. Waymire (1984), Lev and
Penman (1990), King et al (1990), Firth (1998) and Cheng and Firth
(2000) demonstrate that an earnings forecast can be an extremely
important signal of company valuation, and public disclosure of
forecasts can reduce information asymmetry between managers and
investors and hence lower agency costs. However, in order for the
earnings forecast to be useful, it needs to be accurate.
The motivation for this study stems from the fact that there is a
paucity of research in earnings forecast accuracy at the European level
(except the evidences for UK) and internationally in markets outside of
the commonwealth countries. Only few years back there were two
studies at the international level for markets outside of British
Commonwealth status, by Lonkani and Firth (2005) for Thailand and
Jaggi et al (2006) for Taiwan. Our aim is that the emerging findings of
the present study will assist investors with their future assessment of
earnings forecasts, which will in turn further enhance their
understanding of equity valuation.
Additionally there are only few studies examining the association
between management forecast accuracy and pricing of IPOs. This paper
sheds light on the IPO pricing phenomenon and its connection to
forecast error by providing ground to the initial returns reported in each
FE category. It appears that IPOs with pessimistic forecasts are
rewarded with low level of underpricing in the immediate aftermarket
and they ‘leave small amount of money on the table’. Furthermore, there
are evidences that Greek market has mechanisms to recognize IPOs with
optimistic forecasts.
The primary objective is to examine the management’s forecast
accuracy in Greece for firms seeking a listing on the Athens Stock
Exchange. The research is important as earnings forecasts are the major
valuation factor for IPOs in Greece and so this is an important study for
both institutions and private investors (helping them to make future
investment decisions on new issues). The mandatory status in Greece
for new firms to furnish management earnings forecasts in their
prospectuses provides a rare test case for an ongoing debate on the
usefulness of the forecasts in the market valuation of IPOs.
Mandatory forecast of earnings would allow the investors to search
how accurately a firm can provide this figure. Comparing to countries
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with voluntary supplied forecasts the big advantage of mandatory
disclosure is that it helps investors to explore the low quality IPOs and
segregate them from promising firms. Those IPOs are naked with this
method as they have neither the ability nor incentives to make good
prediction so they provide a forecast with big error. On the other hand
their bad quality can be hidden behind the choice option that voluntarily
method creates. Additionally mandatory status helps some good firms
which would be skeptical to reveal their forecast earnings under the
voluntary method to signal their quality by providing an accurate figure.
The next section of the paper reviews some of the literature on the
accuracy of IPO earnings forecasts. The institutional characteristics of
the new-issue process in Greece are described in section III.
Determinants of earnings forecasts are analysed in section IV and this
is followed by a methodology and data description in section V. Section
VI provides a presentation and discussion of the results. Finally, a
summary and conclusion are made.
II.  Previous Research
Disclosure of management earnings forecasts is optional in many
markets. When it comes to the voluntary disclosure of profits there is
great interest by researchers (Trueman, (1986); Darrough and
Stoughton, (1990); Darrough, (1993); Frankel et al, (1995)) on studying
the accuracy of this information. Many studies have been conducted for
countries with less litigious environments including mainly British
Commonwealth States (Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Singapore and South Africa). On the other hand, there has
been only one study on forecasts in the U.S. market, put forward by
Kasznik (1999). The disclosure of earnings forecasts for IPOs in the
U.S. has been almost non-existent due to its highly competitive
environment.
Keasey and McGuiness (1991) examine the accuracy of voluntary
earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses in the UK market. They address
that the disclosure of this information depends upon a firm’s
competitive situation relative to other players. Their findings reveal a
positive bias, and they report that management typically underestimates
future earnings. Clarkson et al (1989) for Canada, Firth et al (1995) for
Singapore, Jelic et al (1998) for Malaysia, Mbuthia and Ward (2003) for
South Africa and Jaggi et al (2006) for Taiwan all predict positive
forecast errors. On the other hand, Firth and Smith (1992) for New
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Zealand, Hartnett and Romcke (2000) for Australia and Lonkani and
Firth (2005) for Thailand report negative average forecast errors.
Evidence on the accuracy of management earnings forecast reveals
absolute forecast errors from as low as 10.4% by Firth (1998) for
Singapore and 11% for UK by Keasey & McGuinness (1991) to an
enormous 1138% reported by Lee (1993) for Australia. The last high
result attracted more researchers to study the Australasian case. In a
more recent study Hartnett & Romcke (2000) report a high 88.29%,
which indicates that the regulatory environment should become more
strict in the case of Australian IPOs.
A similar outcome is indicated by studies carried out in New
Zealand with AFE, which vary from 100% in the study by Mak (1989)
up to 328% by (Firth & Smith, (1992). The level of errors is high
compared to UK: Keasey & McGuinness (1991) at 11%, and Hong
Kong by Jaggi (1997) at 12.79%. Table 1 summarizes the results of
previous studies on forecasting and the accuracy of earnings forecasts
in IPOs prospectuses.
III. Institutional framework of ASE
The ASE began its operations in 1879 and is the oldest stock exchange
in the Balkan area and one of the oldest stock markets on the European
continent. It took more than a century for the exchange to taste
considerable growth. During the last decade of the twentieth century,
many regulatory changes brought a revolution in the number of firms
traded on the ASE. The number of companies climbed from 150 at the
end of 1993 to more than 330 at the end of 2001. The Main market is
the major component of the ASE associated with Parallel and New
Markets. Most of the firms are traded in the Main market while during
the period of our study there were more entrances into the Secondary
(parallel) market of the ASE. The total market capitalisation of the firms
traded has increased from €9.8 billion at the end of 1994 to €200 billion
at the end of 1999. Another noticeable area of growth is observed in the
net profits of the IPOs, which increased from €560 million in 1993 to
€1.7 billion by the end of 2001.
The Athens Stock Exchange, in principal, requires new issues to
make mandatory disclosure of profit forecasts in their prospectuses.
Thus, Greece is one of the few countries that, in order to reduce
information asymmetry, the managers of firms making IPOs are
required to disclose a profit forecast for the forthcoming year. Similar
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places experiencing this shift are the markets in Malaysia, New Zealand,
Singapore and Thailand. In contrast, IPOs in Australia, Canada, Hong
Kong, South Africa, Taiwan and U.S. are not required to disclose a
profit forecast in their prospectuses. In addition, the London Stock
Exchange requires companies to include a statement of financial and
trading prospects in their prospectuses while profit forecasts are not
mandatory.
IV.  Methodology & Sample Description
A. Models on earnings forecast
The accuracy of earnings forecasts that are disclosed in the Greek IPO
prospectus is examined by using common forecast error measures,
which have been referred to in the literature by (Chan et al., (1996); and
Jelic et al., (1998)). Comparing actual earnings figures for ‘accounting
year t’ with earnings forecasts gives an indication of their accuracy. The
most widely used forecast errors metrics are forecast error, absolute
forecast error, and square forecast error. The forecast error measures are
estimated, as shown below.
The forecast error for company (i) for the year of the IPO (t) is
calculated as follows:
(1)( ) ,it it it itFE AP FP FP= −
Where FEit, is the forecast error for company i, APit, stands for actual
profit for company i; and FPit, is the forecast profit as given in the IPO
prospectus.
The mean forecast error is a measure of bias in forecasting. It
examines whether company management systematically over or
underestimates earnings for firms in Greece. By examining the sign of
the forecast error (positive and negative), we can conclude whether a
company is optimistic or pessimistic about its future profits since we
test whether the profits are overestimated or underestimated. A positive
value for the mean forecast error (MFE) implies that, on average, IPO
companies have a pessimistic bias (firms under-forecast) while a
negative value for MFE represents an optimistic bias (firms
over-forecast).
The Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) is taken using the absolute value
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of the forecast errors (FEs) for each Greek IPO. In this study, the
‘absolute forecast error’ measures the relative deviation of actual
earnings from forecast earnings and provides an indication of how close
the forecasts were to actual profits in absolute terms. The earnings are
before tax and before extraordinary items. Brown et al. (2000) report
that the absolute forecast error measures forecast accuracy and the
signed forecast error measures the bias. The AFE is measured by:
(2)( ) ,it it it itAFE AP FP FP= −
Where AFE=Absolute Forecast Error
Square Forecast Error (SQFE) is measured using the square of the
forecast error. The squared forecast error gives more weight to large
errors and, as Bhaskar and Morris (1984) specify, it is more appropriate
for an analysis of investors’ losses due to forecast inaccuracy. Firth and
Smith (1992) specify that squared forecast error better models the loss
to investors due to an erroneous forecast.
(3)( )( )2 ,it it it itSQFE AP FP FP= −
Brown et al. (1987) introduced a statistic that measures the superiority
of forecasting profits (SUP) relative to the actual changes in profits.
Management forecast superiority measures the ability of management
to anticipate earnings more accurately than time series models. This
measure is adapted for the Greek IPO market. One reason for the use of
this metric is the difficulty in predicting the earnings of a specific Greek
company. Positive value for SUP means that the Greek IPO profit
forecast is more accurate than a forecast based on the random walk
model. Otherwise, a negative value implies that the IPO forecast is
inaccurate.
The measure of superiority is applied here for the IPO market:
(4)( ) ( )[ ]21ln ,t t it tSUP AP AP AP FP−= − −
Where SUP is the superiority in forecasting profits relative to the actual
change in profits, APt, stands for actual profit in year t, APt–1 is the
actual profit in year t–1 and FPt symbolises the forecast profit in year
t; 
The denominator measures the error in the IPO forecast while the
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numerator is the change in profit from year t–1 to year t. The numerator
can also be regarded as the forecast error from a simple time series
forecasting process, where APt–1  is a random walk model estimate of
the profit in year t. 
B. Models on Underpricing
For each IPO considered, they were calculated two measures of
underpricing: (i) the ‘raw’ underpricing, defined as the difference in
percentage between the price of the share in the end of first day of
trading and the offer (listing) price, (ii) the underpricing is ‘adjusted’ for
market changes, taking into account changes of the Athens Stock
Exchange Composite Index (ASECI) between the closing date and the
first day of trading measured between the start of the public offering and
the end of the first day of listing.1 The difference between the two
metrics was more visible in the 1990s, when listings used to take place
much later than the offering. During large time lag periods, many
changes in market conditions could occur. As a fact the initial return
measured may be a result of changes in market conditions. So this is the
reason raw initial return is adjusted for market changes and variances.2
Raw Initial Returns
(5),1 ,0,
,0
,i ii t
i
P P
RIR
P
−=
Market Excess Returns3
4
(6),1 ,0 ,1 ,0
,0 ,0
,i i i it
i i
P P MI MI
MER
P MI
⎡ − − ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
1. In this analysis the market index was assumed to be the historical ASEGI index 
2. These calculations are appropriate because the equilibrium prices of stock exchange
reflect not only the companies’ special characteristics but also, during the formation process,
by the ascending and descending of capital market.
3. RIRi,t= Raw initial return of company ‘i’ at period t, MERi,t=Market excess return of
company ‘i’ at period t, Pi,0=IPO offer price as per prospectus of company ‘i’, Pi,1=Closing
price of IPO of company ‘i’ at the end of the first trading day, MIi,0=ASE Composite Index
at the date of prospectus company ‘i’, MIi,1=ASE Composite Index at the close of first trading
day of company ‘i’ 
4. MER=Market excess return, MIi,1 and MIi,0 ASE Composite index on day 1 and offer
prices setting date.
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C. Sample Description
The study examines 208 IPOs listed on the Athens Stock Exchange’s
Main and parallel boards over the period from 1994 to 2001. The
majority of data is hand collected and extracted from IPO prospectuses,
the daily press and ASE reports. The prospectuses were referenced from
the library, the ASE website and the Capital Market Commission
resource centre. Data for the offer price, total gross proceeds, age of
IPO companies, percentage of shares retained by owners, underwriters,
and the closing date of the offer are extracted from the prospectuses.   
To be included in the final sample, IPO prospectuses were required
to contain precise earnings forecast figures. Those prospectuses that
provided a forecasted range of expected earnings, or other non-specific
forms of performance forecast, were excluded from the analysis, thus
leaving 208 firms in the sample.
V.  Determinants of Earnings Forecasts
In order to gain some insight into the reasons for good forecasting
performance, a number of hypotheses were constructed and tested with
respect to potential determinants. Based on past research and on a priori
reasoning, we have identified fourteen potential determinants of profit
forecast accuracy. Eight factors were chosen for this study and these are
investigated as potential determinants of absolute forecast error. Those
independent variables are company size, forecast horizon, age, financial
leverage, underwriter reputation, proportion of shares retained by inside
owners, industry classification and general economic conditions. Note
that some of the variables considered by other researchers were not
investigated, either because they have been only sporadically associated
with absolute forecast error or because there was not such a case in the
Greek market. Table 2 shows the key and most recent studies, and their
observed significance.
To find out the possible determinants of AFE and to explore their
relative relationships, the following hypotheses are constructed:
Firm Size (SIZE): The evidence in the literature suggests that it is
easier to forecast the profits of larger companies than their smaller
counterparts. Cox (1985), Firth and Smith (1992), Brown et al. (2000),
Chen et al. (2001) and Dutta and Gingler (2002) report that large firms
have more control over their market setting, enjoy comparative
245Management Forecast Accuracy and Pricing of IPOs in Athens Stock Exchange
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economies of scale, and tend to be more diversified than smaller firms.
This makes the earnings of larger firms less volatile, more predictable,
and more accurate.
On the other hand, smaller companies tend to have less stable
earnings, hence there is less opportunity for management making a more
accurate earnings forecast in the first place (Jelic et al, (1998). In the
case of small firms, managers have more difficulty in monitoring the use
of the funds, and have greater difficulty in predicting the firm’s future
earnings that flow from their deployment.
However, larger firms are usually more diversified with a higher
level of control in their market settings. This gives them more control
over the level of profits because they have better information gathering
and forecasting mechanisms. Their forecasts are likely to be more
accurate than those of the smaller firms.
C1 Larger firms enjoy lower forecasting errors through their ability to
use more sophisticated forecasting techniques
Period of forecast – Horizon (HOR): There is some support in the
literature for a positive relationship between FE and forecasting horizon
as the forecasting process involves uncertainty and risk (i.e. accuracy
tends to deteriorate with longer horizons). More specifically, there is the
view that the longer the forecast horizon, the more likely the occurrence
of unexpected changes. A brief explanation of the phenomenon is based
on the amount of information a firm can cluster during the fiscal year.
The information helps ensure a more secure prediction as it approaches
the time for the announcement of the actual results.
Chen et al. (2001) argue that forecasting errors can be expected to
increase as forecast intervals lengthen. They also reveal a significant
positive relationship between forecast horizon and forecast error. Lee
et al. (1993) document that the longer the forecast period, the greater is
the opportunity for management to exercise discretion in maintenance
and capital expenditure decisions, thus enabling actual and predicted
results to be more closely aligned. Brown et al (1987) and Kasznik
(1999) show that the shorter the time interval in months between the
prospectus date and the year end to which the forecast pertains, the
more accurate the forecast becomes. Based on the above evidence, we
formulate the following hypothesis:
C2 AFE is lower for IPOs that publish their forecast in short horizon
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periods from the fiscal year end. The longer the interval, the greater
the error.
Following Lee et al (2006) we measure forecast horizon as the
number of months between the prospectus date and the end of the
forecast period.
Age of Firm (AGE): Previous studies postulate that the longer a firm
has been in existence, the greater the forecasting accuracy,
predominantly because the predictions for earnings for completely new
firms are extremely difficult compared to a firm with a solid earnings
history.
Jelic et al. (1998) and Jog and McConomy (2003) specify that the
profits of companies with no prior operating history are likely to be
more difficult to forecast, given the fact that historical data are a very
important input to the process of forecasting. Mak (1994) points out that
even if a new company is to rely on the operating history of other
companies in the same or a related industry, the available information
on the operating history of those companies is likely to be a less reliable
predictor of future earnings than one’s own operating history. 
Chen et al. (2001) report that older companies may be viewed as
being less risky as they have more experience to draw on when making
forecasts of their profits. On the other hand, Jaggi (1997) reports that
younger companies may not be able to fully understand and appreciate
the environmental impact on their future performance, and the lack of
historical bases may hinder their capability to make accurate forecasts.
All those views lead to a third hypothesis:
C3 Forecasting accuracy improves the longer the company has been in
existence. 
We calculate age as the number of years from the date of
incorporation until prospectus day.
Financial Leverage (LEV): The net profits of companies with
comparatively high levels of debt are traditionally regarded as being
more difficult to forecast. To accommodate this factor as a determinant
of forecast accuracy, we introduce the independent variable of leverage.
Variability in profit and leverage are well accepted in the literature as
measures of a company’s risk, Hartnett and Romcke, (2000). Chen et al.
(2001) employed leverage to describe the mix of loan finance and equity
finance in a company. They report that profit forecasting is more
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difficult for risky companies that are highly leveraged.
Eddy and Seifert (1992) in an earlier study document that the higher
the financial leverage, the higher the risk faced by the firm. In this case,
there is the expectation of higher error for firms with comparatively
high levels of debt. Thus, a negative relationship between leverage and
the level of accuracy is hypothesised: 
C4 Absolute forecast error is positively associated with high levels of
financial leverage.
We measure leverage as the ‘long term debt over the total assets’ of
the company at the year-end date of the year under forecast.
Underwriter Reputation (UND): A fifth hypothesis relates to the
credibility of underwriters. Previous research has examined the
importance of reputation signalling and reveals that prestigious
underwriters are associated with more accurate information, higher fees
for their services, and are involved in more flotation (through their
experience) compared with the non-reputable underwriters. 
Titman and Trueman (1986) and Keasey and McGuinness (1991)
stress that the choice of a high quality underwriter can be viewed as a
signalling mechanism where high quality underwriters will be selected
by firms with more favourable information. They suggest that an owner
with more favourable information will be willing to pay the fee of a
more credible advisory body.
Firth and Smith (1992) and Brown et al. (2000) report that the
forecast provided by firms going public with a prestigious underwriter
is more accurate, as it is likely that the forecasts are based on
information provided by underwriters. A high quality underwriter is
argued to have lower agency costs and come at a lower risk for the firm. 
More reputable underwriters are expected to face greater expected
loss to reputation, in the case of a misrepresentation. Dunbar (2000) and
Chen et al. (2001) suggest that large forecast errors will damage
underwriter reputation and so there is clear incentive to closely monitor
the profit forecasts. The commentators support that, principally, bankers
and underwriters add credibility to companies when raising capital. To
accommodate this factor as a determinant of forecast accuracy, the
following hypothesis is constructed:
C5 We hypothesise a negative relationship between the AFE and the
reputation of the underwriter.
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Underwriter reputation (UNW) is a dummy variable taking the value
one (1) if the underwriter is a reputable bank, otherwise UNW is coded
zero (0).
Retained Ownership (OWN): The proportion of retained ownership
held by pre-issue owners may reflect forecast integrity. A lower
proportion may signal owner concern about forecast accuracy while a
high level of retained ownership indicates higher confidence and
forecast achievability.
Ruland et al. (1990), Firth and Liau-Tan (1997) and Jelic et al.
(1998) suggest that a higher percentage of management share-ownership
may signal that the directors-owners are more confident about the future
prospects of the company, and are likely to commit more resources and
attach a greater importance to the earnings forecast as a signal of the
quality of their company.
Jog and McConomy (1997) and Chen et al. (2001) report that
insiders have other means to predict profits, while outsiders have to rely
on the prospectus forecast. They argue that the larger the number of
outside shareholders, the greater the problem if the forecasts are
inaccurate. Otherwise, the possibility of a decline in share price is less
likely to deter managers, who retain little or no interest in the firm, from
providing optimistic forecasts since its limited post-IPO market share
affects their wealth less.
The percentage of post-offer retained ownership to be held by
pre-offer owners is used as a proxy. To accommodate this factor as a
determinant of forecast accuracy, the following hypothesis is
constructed.
C6 Proportion of shares retained by inside owners is negatively related
to absolute forecast error.
Industry Classification (IND): Industrial classification has an
association with the level of forecast accuracy, mainly due to
differences in various sectors’ cost structures and revenue volatility.
This is because each sector faces competition and complexity that may
make it easier for firms in some industries to forecast more accurately.
Prior studies have used industry groups when analysing forecast error.
In most of the cases, the evidence suggests that industrial classified
firms are related to forecast accuracy.
Mak (1989) and Jelic et al. (1998) found ‘industry’ to be a
significant variable. They argue that earnings forecasts become even
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more important when the Security Commission requires IPOs in specific
sectors to provide guarantees for their profit forecast. IPO companies in
those sectors proved to be less accurate in forecasting their profits than
companies in other sectors. Hartnett and Romcke (2000) report that
since management’s forecasting ability relates to the predictability of
industry activity, unexpected activity should incur a greater forecasting
error.
For the purpose of the Greek case, we compare companies from the
service sector, transportation, – non industrial firms – that have more
unpredicted activities with companies from all other sectors – industrial
firms – with more predicted activities. In order to test this hypothesis,
(IND) is assigned a dummy variable of one (1) if the company is among
the industrial firms (expected sector activities), otherwise IND is coded
zero (0) if it belongs to service sectors, transportation, (unexpected
sector activities).
C7 A negative association is hypothesised between industrial firms and
forecast error. 
Economic Condition (ECON): A critical challenge for any economy
is the optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities. Gross
domestic product (GDP) is the base we apply to measure economic
conditions.5
Pedwell et al. (1994) and Hartnett and Romcke (2000) suggest that
the ability to forecast accurately is influenced by the variability of the
economic conditions in effect from the beginning to the end of the
forecast period. They specify, somewhat obviously, that the more
unstable economic conditions are, the more difficult it is to forecast
accurately. Additionally, Chan et al. (1996) report that the larger the
fluctuations in economic activity, the more the absolute forecast error
that one would expect in forecasts. In that case, smaller change in GDP
produces a lower level of errors in earnings forecasts. To examine this
notion, the following hypothesis is formulated. 
C8 Absolute forecast error tends to be lower the smaller the changes in
economic conditions (measured by GDP).
5. Gross domestic product represents the total market value of all final goods and
services produced in a given year, equal to total consumer, investment and government
spending, plus the value of exports, minus the value of imports 
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Hypothesis one through eight are tested by the following multiple
regression using the error metrics. 
AFE and SUP vary across companies, so we estimate two
cross-sectional models to help us explain the variations. We test the
following model for AFE:
* * * * *
1 2 3 4 5lnAFE a SIZE HOR AGE LEV UNDβ β β β β= + + + + + +
(7)* * *6 7 8 ,OWN IND ECONβ β β ε+ + +
* * * * *
1 2 3 4 5lnSUP a SIZE HOR AGE LEV UNDβ β β β β= + + + + + +
(8)* * *6 7 8 ,OWN IND ECONβ β β ε+ + +
In the above equation, the absolute forecast error and superiority by
management in forecasting profits relative to the actual change in profits
for each company are used as dependent variables. The R2 and
F-statistics are used to test whether the above-mentioned variables could
significantly explain absolute forecast error.
VI.  Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
Distributional statistics of forecast errors, absolute forecast errors and
forecasting superiority measures are shown in table 3. The mean
forecast error for the sample is 8.04 percent while the positive sign for
mean forecast earnings reveals that reported profits (actual) exceed their
forecasted profits. This result contradicts international evidence that
management of IPOs are typically over-optimistic in their earning
forecast. In addition, it is consistent with Allen et al (1997), who report
that profits are frequently adjusted upward if they are expected to fall
below forecast, but rarely drift down if the forecast is exceeded. 
Psychology helps us to provide an explanation on the higher reported
profits in Athens Stock Exchange comparing with forecasted earnings.
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The Greek mentality allows the investors and all interesting parts to
accept a pessimistic version of a forecast rather than a prediction which
overestimates the profit. Further the mandatory disclosure of earnings
forecasts creates incentives for managers to manipulate earnings during
the year following the public offering. Indeed, firms who mandatory
include earnings forecasts in their offering prospectuses are expected to
differ from non forecasters of countries with voluntary status in their
level of earnings management during the year following the public
offering. The investigation of earnings management in the new issues
market is based on the estimation of discretionary accruals (e.g.,
TABLE 3. Summary statistics of IPO profit accuracy 
A.  Descriptive statistics of dependent variables
Variable FE (%) AFE (%) SQFE (%) SUP
Mean 8.04 42.82 3044 2.25
Median 2.12 36.55 1340 1.55
St. Dev 54.39 34.67 5937 2.35
Min –105.30 0.38 0.14 –2.35
Max 234.82 234.82 55140 14.31
Skewness 0.80 1.97 5.59 1.94
Kyrtosis 1.47 6.77 39.21 5.29
Sample Size 208 208 208 208
 
B.  Parametric and Non Parametric tests
Test Method
Parametric Test
(One sample T-test) Non parametric Tests
Kolmogov Smirnov, Wilcoxon test,
T-test,  p value p-value p-value
FE (2.137), [0.034] (0.996), [0.275] [0.016]
AFE (17.834), [0.000] (1.592), [0.013] [0.000]
SQFE (7.378), [0.000] (4.375), [0.000] [0.000]
SUP (1.009), [0.314] (1.604), [0.012] [0.162]
Note:  This table shows profit forecast accuracy using five metrics. The four measures
are forecast error, absolute forecast error, square route forecast error and forecast superiority.
FE, Forecast Error = (APit – FPit) / |FPit|;  AFE, Absolute Forecast Error = |(APit – FPit)| / |FPit|
and SQFE, Square Forecast Error = (APit – FPit / FPit); SUP = ln[((APit – APit–1)/(APit-FPit))
2.
FE = profit forecast error; AP = actual profit; FP = profit forecast as given in the IPO
prospectus; For FE, test of average (mean and median=0 vs. average not=0; For AFE and
SQFE, test of average (mean and median)=0 vs. average>0; Test statistics (*) and p-values
[*] indicate the level of significance different from zero using the Wilcoxon median test. ***
Significant at the one per cent level **Significant at the five per cent level *Significant at the
ten per cent level.
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Dechow, (1995); Jones, (1991); Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2001).
The mean absolute forecast error is 42.82 percent. This finding is
higher than prior evidence (Firth and Smith (1992);  Lee et al. (1993);
Pedwell et al. (1994); Jelic et al. (1998); Brown et al. (2000); Lonkani
and Firth (2005); Jaggi et al (2006); Gounopoulos and Skinner (2010)).
The mean forecast error and mean absolute forecast error for Greek
IPOs are quite small compared to the results of Australia, Canada, China
and New Zealand. Overall, the earnings forecasts in Greece can be
characterised by a medium level of accuracy with a pessimistic bias. 
Panel B of table 3 sets out the results of the analysis of the four
different forecast errors discussed and reported below. The reported
values suggest that mean FE is significantly different from zero at five
percent. The mean of AFE is also significantly different from zero at the
one percent level. Using non-parametric tests for the median, the FE is
also significantly different from zero.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables.
The mean age of the companies examined is 17.8 years (median 15
years). The maximum value for age is 115 years and the minimum is a
couple of months. The forecast horizon varies between one and twelve
months. The mean forecast horizon for the sample is 127.33 trading
days or 5.5 months. The size of the sample companies varies
substantially. The biggest company measured by issue size during the
forecast period, amounting to €8.05 billion, is Hellenic
Telecommunication Organization while the company with the lowest
size at €5.3 million is Informatics SA.  On average, the owners of the
sample firms retained just over three quarters of their shares after the
IPO with a range from 13.70 to 95.23 percent The average leverage
(Long term liabilities/ Total Assets) is 7.12 percent with a range of 0.1
percent to 43.39.
Panel A of table 5 summarizes the forecast errors, together with the
Mean Forecast Error (MFE) for the IPOs during the specified year. A
negative value of MFE implies that the earnings forecasts for the IPOs
during that particular year are overstated relative to the actual earnings
reported. The results show a balance in the number of IPOs with
positive and negative forecast errors. The MFE does not present a
specific trend among the years but it is worth noting that during year
2001, only two firms had a positive FE and the remaining 11 had a
negative result. 
Panel B of table 5 indicates the absolute forecast error during each
specified year of the sample. There are 62 firms with a quite low AFE
(less than 20%) while there are 55 firms with a high AFE (more than
60%). Individual results show that firms listed during 2000 experienced
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the lowest mean AFE. There have been 113 IPOs with an AFE below
40% and 95 newly listed firms with an AFE over 40%. On the other
hand, during 1999, which was one of the hot periods for the ASE, the
market experienced the highest MAFE.
When a firm makes a forecast, the main target is to be as accurate as
possible. It is rare for a forecast to be 100% accurate so some cases
show an optimistic view by the management and other cases lean
pessimistic. Table 6 classifies IPOs by pessimistic/optimistic forecast
earnings, containing 101 and 107 firms respectively. The mean of
forecast error for pessimists is 49.90 percent (median 43.62%) while the
mean for optimists’ lies at –35.72 percent (median of –31.05%). Panel
B of table 3.7 contains the values of the t-statistics and the p-values of
the parametric pair-sampled and non-parametric Wilcoxon-test. The
results reveal that there is a high difference between the two samples.
The ownership of Greek firms is far more concentrated than in the
TABLE 5. Summary of FE and AFE by year of listing
A.  Percentage Forecast Error
–30% 0% to Over MFE
Listing Year <–30% to 0% 30% 30% Total (%)
1994 13 11 7 14 45 0.36
1995 3 3 5 8 19 25.94
1996 4 4 4 5 17 19.11
1997 2 1 2 5 10 –6.21
1998 5 4 6 9 24 15.48
1999 6 7 6 12 31 20.25
2000 13 13 11 12 49 1.36
2001 6 5 1 1 13 –36.22
Total 52 48 42 66 208 8.04
B.  Percentage Absolute Forecast Error
20% 40% Over MAFE
Listing Year <20% to 40% to 60% 60% Total (%)
1994 10 14 10 11 45 42.65
1995 5 6 3 5 19 38.45
1996 7 2 2 6 17 49.86
1997 2 3 2 3 10 40.17
1998 9 3 5 7 24 39.00
1999 8 6 8 9 31 51.13
2000 17 14 9 9 49 37.49
2001 4 3 1 5 13 47.49
Total 62 51 40 55 208 42.82
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United States, and Greek firms may make more use of dual class IPOs,
Smart and  Zutter  (2003). Panel C classifies IPOs by the level of
retained ownership. The results indicate that when the retained
ownership is high we meet pessimistic earning forecast of –3.04% while
in the cases with low retained ownership by pre-IPO holders the earning
forecast is optimistic at 14.22%.  Thus when ownership remain
concentrated, controlling owners have an incentive to provide outside
shareholder and investors less information in order to more freely
exercise private benefits of control. That could account for the
pessimistic forecasts.
B. Underpricing and ‘money left in the table’
Table 7, Panel A, summarizes the results obtained by calculating the
‘raw’ and ‘adjusted’ mean underpricing over time. The number of firms
exhibiting a positive (negative) underpricing is also reported. For year
1999 results exclude data of some IT company, because of their huge
underpricing, due to the high-tech and Internet euphoria. The mean
‘simple’ underpricing, relative to the whole sample of 208 firms, is
TABLE 6. Forecast Error (FE) and Absolute Forecast Error (AFE) categorisation
by pessimistic/optimistic forecast and High/Low retained ownership 
A.  Categorization of pessimistic/optimistic forecast
Trend of forecast No of IPOs FE Mean FE Median AFE Mean
Pessimistic 101 –35.72 –31.05 35.72
Optimistic 107 49.90 43.62 49.90
All 208 8.04 2.48 42.82
B.  Statistics for difference in means and medians
t-statistics for difference in means Wilcoxon test for difference in median
FE FE
–8.524 [0.000]*** –8.725 [0.000]***
C.  Categorization of High/Low Retained Ownership
Trend of forecast No of IPOs FE Mean FE Median AFE Mean
High Retained Own 101 –3.04 –2.32 41.10
Low Retained Own 107 14.22 13.21 43.35
All 208 8.04 2.48 42.82
Note:  Test statistics and p-values [*] indicate the level of significance for the differences
in mean (T-Tests) and median (Wilcoxon test); *** Significant at one percent level;
**Significant at five percent level; *Significant at one percent level.
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equal to 41.85%, (42.67% if one considers the ‘adjusted’ return). In
1999, IPOs were significantly underpriced: given that during that period
the market momentum was favourable, this is consistent with the ‘hot
issue markets’ theory Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), Ritter (1984) and
Brailsford et al. (2000).6
For the period 1993 to Dec 1996 , the average level of underpricing
is low (because of the daily ±8% price cap which was introduced in the
Greek Market in 1993 and was abolished in 1997). This price cap was
not allowing any IPO overpass this limit during a day and if the firm
was reaching that level then the trading was immediately interrupted
and rescheduled for the next day, Thomadakis et al. (2011). Thus the
price cap constraints being in force on the Greek stock market, exerted
substantial limitation into the fair initial price formation of IPOs.
Carefully study of both IR and MER shows that there is increase in all
the following years revealing that price cap prevented IPOs from
reaching the equilibrium price.
Analysis of the IPOs seems to reveal a strong reduction in the
underpricing during 2000, with mean values of about 57%, being even
lower in 2001. Therefore it is worth investigating the determinants of
such a pattern (table 10).
Table 7, Panel B computes the amount of money ‘left on the table’.7
Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) underlined that underpricing is not the
entrepreneur’s primary concern, although it may represent an
opportunity cost. Issuers are expected to minimize the reduction in
underpricing-induced wealth losses, which increase with the
underpricing but also with the number of shares sold in the IPO.
Additionally, Loughran and Ritter (2002) noticed that entrepreneurs
rarely get upset about money left on the table.8 As Greek inflation has
6. Brailsford et al. (2000) analyze the behavior of the U.S. IPO market. They formally
document the existence of hot and cold periods. By using a variety of IPO activity measures
that capture different aspects of IPO volume, proceeds and underpricing the authors identify
a number of hot periods over activity measures. They further document a leading relationship
between underpricing and IPO volume of up to six months, supporting the contention that the
decision to issue is a function of current underpricing.
7. Money ‘left on the table’ is defined as the offer price to closing market price on the
first day of trading, multiplied by the number of shares offered. 
8. Introducing the ‘prospect theory’ of issuers’ behaviour, Loughran and Ritter (2002)
argue that IPOs where wealth losses are large are almost invariably those where the offer
price and market price are higher than originally expected. Thus, controlling issuers generally
simultaneously discover they are wealthier than they expected to be, and underpricing may
be considered an indirect form of underwriter compensation.
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not been negligible during the 1990s and early 2000s, all statistics had
to be adjusted to reflect inflation ratios provided by the Greek Statistical
Authority.
The mean amount of ‘money left on the table’ is equal to €52.722
million (€73.051 million inflation adjusted). From 1995 to 1999, an
increase in the mean amount of wealth losses is observed; in contrast,
in 2000 the total and mean amounts of ‘money left on the table’
decreases and in 2001 are very low. In sum, one cannot report a clear
trend in the mean amount, because of the influence of large privatization
IPOs (Aussenegg (2000), Choi and Nam (2006)) (in which the number
of offered shares is very large and potential wealth losses are larger).
One would expect underpricing to be lower in IPOs with voluntarily
status of earnings forecast, coherent with the ‘information gathering
theory’ of Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In fact, if earnings forecast are
not mandatory in the prospectus, the intermediates may benefit from the
feedback about the level of this information as they have more time to
reduce uncertainty and may incorporate it in the final offer price. The
last is in line with Dutta and Gigler (2002) theory that investors benefit
from receiving voluntary management earnings forecasts despite of
related incentives for earnings management. They analytically
determine that the benefit of receiving earnings forecasts exceeds the
cost that investors incur.
Table 8, Panel A show that, among the 208 IPO companies, only
30% have an absolute forecast error (AFE) below a value of 0.2 while
36.5% have an AFE above 0.5. Most companies have an AFE value of
0.1 through 0.2, while only eight companies among the Greek IPOs have
an AFE greater than 1.00. Overall, it does not seem to be the case that
many of the newly issued companies reported their actual profit
earnings very close to their actual earnings. The study of forecast error
shows that 42% of the Greek forecasts were clustered among ± 0.02%
of actual earnings. This percentage is not satisfactory therefore, the
management of future IPOs should make additional efforts for the
improved forecasting of earnings.
Panel B examines the relation between the accuracy of management
forecasts and the pricing of IPOs. The results indicate that the average
level of underpricing in most of the AFE categories is near the mean
level of returns (41.85% for raw returns and 42.67% for excess returns),
although there are some notable differentiations in the categories with
high AFEs.
Specifically, the riskiest IPOs (i.e., those with an AFE higher than
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1.00) present an extremely high level of underpricing, which is mainly
explained by Sherman and Titman’s (2002) theory of information
disclosure. They observe that the riskiest firms are the most
underpriced, as the institutional investors do not feel confident and need
more private information to reduce uncertainty about the firm’s value.
The level of underpricing for newly listed firms with AFEs between 0.8
and 1 is both surprising and inconsistent with the trend of IPOs with
AFEs less than 1, as the returns to investors vary, on average, from
14.16% to 30.41%.
The findings on FEs shed more light on the phenomenon of IPO
pricing and its relation to the forecast error. The issuers of IPOs with the
most pessimistic forecasts seem to be rewarded for these predictions, as
their firms are underpriced only by 9.05%. On the other hand, the Greek
market shows unique maturity as it recognizes at an early stage the IPOs
with optimistic forecasts and penalizes them with a high level of
underpricing. Finally, the IPOs with perfect forecasts are not rewarded
for this precise information, as their underpricing is exactly on the
average of our total sample. We conclude that it is better to provide a
pessimistic forecast of the earnings in the prospectus, as this is a signal
for low underpricing in the aftermarket.
C. Cross sectional regression results for AFE
Multiple regression techniques can be used to take further investigation
of forecast errors. A first issue of concern, before proceeding into the
regressions, is the multi-collinearity test. The Pearson Correlation
Matrix between the independent variables in table 9 shows that the
highest correlation appears between SIZE-ECON with a negative
coefficient of (0.453).
The results of the multiple regression models are shown in table 9.
The regression is highly significant (p=0.008) but with an adjusted R2
of only 9.6 percent. An individual study of the variables starts with size,
which has not proved to be statistically related to forecast accuracy. The
coefficient for size variable has the opposite sign to our prediction.
Thus, the trend of our finding is consistent with the results reported by
Firth and Smith ((1992)), Chan et al. ((1996)), and Baginski and Hassell
((1997)), who found that managers in larger firms tend to be less
accurate than managers in smaller firms.
The coefficient for horizon is consistent (positive) with our
expectations for absolute forecast error but it is not significant at any
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level. This result is consistent with the results reported by Firth and
Smith (1992). Jelic et al. (1998) link the lack of significance with the
relatively short forecast horizon during which new funds are more
difficult to estimate. The next variable to study is the age coefficient,
which is highly statistically related to absolute forecast error. This
finding is in line with all evidence, indicating that profits of companies
with a shorter operating history are intrinsically more difficult to
forecast and indeed older firms announce more accurate forecast profits.
Our result for age is consistent with the results reported by Firth and
Smith (1992), indicating greater forecast accuracy for firms with longer
operating histories.
The coefficient for leverage (long-term debt over total assets) is
positive – consistent with the hypothesised positive sign – and
statistically insignificant. This result shows that the leverage control
factor is in the correct direction but is not powerful enough to explain
absolute forecast accuracy. The result confirms the findings of Eddy and
Seifert (1992) and Chen et al. (2001), that the higher the financial
leverage, the higher the risk faced by the company and the higher the
absolute forecast error reported.
The underwriters’ reputation variable has a positive sign, opposite
from our hypothesis that the coefficient would be insignificant. In the
Greek case, it appears that more non-reputable underwriters seem to be
associated with better predictive accuracy. This result is inconsistent
with the findings of Chen et al. (2001) and Jog and McConomy (2003),
which had suggested more accurate forecast by management for firms
that were underwritten by reputable underwriters.
The coefficient for industry is negative and statistically significant
at the 5 percent level. This outcome is consistent with the results of
Chan et al. ((1996)), Jelic et al. ((1998)), and Hartnett & Romcke
((2000) in suggesting that non-industrial firms (unexpected sector
activities) are associated with a higher level of earnings forecast error.
Finally, the ‘Econ’ variable has an unexpected negative sign, while the
coefficient is not statistically significant. The results show that the
economic condition in Greece has a negative impact on the AFE.
The explanatory power of the superiority regression model (SUP) in
forecasting profits relative to the actual profits is lower than the AFE
(R2 = 8.1%). In summary, the results on the superiority in forecasting
profits reveals a greater capability of the management of old firms to
predict the earnings of the firm. The result for ‘age’ coefficient is
consistent with the hypothesis and it is statistically significant. The
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result is inconsistent with the results reported by Chen et al. (2001), in
showing greater a superiority in forecasting profits on the part of firms
with a short history.
The ‘own’ variable is also statistically significant. The positive sign
is consistent with our hypothesis that low-retained ownership by
entrepreneurs tends to increase management superiority in their ability
to forecast profits. It might also account for the negative relation
between retained ownership by entrepreneurs and management
superiority in forecasting profits. A third variable, which significantly
influences superiority, is industry classification. This outcome suggests
that industrial-classified firms are associated with a lower level of
management error. The other five factors (i.e. size, forecast horizon,
leverage, underwriter reputation, and change of economic condition)
that we tested do not indicate any statistical significance in explaining
superiority.
The market excess returns results of the regressions, corrected for
heteroskedasticity, are also presented in table 10. We find three factors
that significantly affect the pricing of IPOs in Greece: the size of the
firm, its leverage and the change in economic conditions.
Regarding the offering size of IPOs, we find a significantly negative
relationship with the market excess returns, which is in line with Ritter
(1984), Beatty (1989) and Levis (1993). As expected, a smaller offering
size of a company means a lower marketability of the stock
post-floatation; thus, the investors will face higher risk. Moreover,
manipulation of price by institutional investors is a common practice in
Greece. A smaller floatation size means that institutional investors can
easier control a company’s stock price, thus increasing speculation and
uncertainty of the future price performance of the stocks. Therefore, as
one of the proxies of risk and uncertainty, the offering size has a
negative effect on the initial returns.
The second proxy employed to test the MER and significantly affects
it, is the leverage of the IPO. The estimation result shows significance
with a negative sign on the coefficient which opposes our expectation.
When an issuer decides to go public with a highly indebted firm,
investors expect the company not to have such great potential for future
development and price performance while at the same time the risk of
the company is high. In this case, to compensate for the extra risk
investors take, IPOs with high-leverage features would be more
underpriced.
We find that for listed firms, economic progress is associated with
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high market excess returns. This lends support to the proposition that
since the government knows more than investors about - the state of the
economy, the quality of all issuing companies and the level of risk
involved in initial issues - to convince and attract investors to invest in
the IPO market, makes the government to technically influence
TABLE 10. Cross sectional regression results of AFE, SUP
Specifications AFE SUP IR MER
Constant 128.74 –4.67 388.66 370.88
(1.849)* (–0.924) (4.995)*** (4.714)***
SIZE 0.032 –0.026 –0.185 –0.183
(0.568) (–0.355) (–2.491)** (–2.401)**
HOR 0.018 0.069 –0.052 –0.084
(0.255) (1.165) (–0.780) (–1.231)
AGE –0.172 –0.158 –0.070 –0.066
(–2.333)** (–2.069)** (–1.122) (–1.032)
LEV 0.043 0.009 –0.135 –0.138
(0.829) (0.126) (–2.077)** (–2.072)**
UND 0.046 –0.001 –0.064 –0.057
(0.742) (–0.018) (–0.981) (–0.862)
OWN –0.092 0.148 –0.083 –0.090
(–0.877) (2.234)** (–1.276) (–1.354)
IND –0.198 –0.184 –0.024 –0.027
(–2.367)** (–2.404)** (–0.373) (–0.410)
ECON –0.026 0.090 –0.455 –0.392
(–0.413) (1.180) (–6.742)*** (–5.661)***
R2 0.096 0.081 0.214 0.172
R2 Adjusted 0.060 0.043 0.185 0.141
F-value (2.68) (2.18) (7.25) (5.53)
Note:  This table lists the variables used in the cross sectional regressions; The
independent variables are: Size = logarithm of number of shares issued times the offer price
(issue size); Horizon = length of the forecast period. This is the number of months between
the prospectus date and the next fiscal year end; Age = the number of years from the date of
the company’s incorporation to the IPO date; LEV = by long term debt over the total assets
of the company at the year–end date of the year under forecast; UNW = a dummy variable
taking the value of one, if the underwriter is National Bank of Greece, Commercial Bank of
Greece, Alpha Bank, EFG Eurobank and Piraeus Bank, otherwise UNW is coded zero; OWN
= proportion of shares retained by insiders/pre IPO owners; IND = dummy variable taking the
value of one if the company is industrial classified, otherwise IND is coded zero if IPO
belongs to service sector - transportation, finance and banking, ECON = the change in
economic condition, measured by taking the annual growth (measured as a percentage in GDP
for the year of flotation; The t-statistics are robust for heteroskedasticity; t-values are in
parenthesis; *** Significant at the one per cent level; **Significant at five per cent level; 
*Significant at ten per cent level 
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underpricing of IPOs.
VII.  Conclusion
Studies on the accuracy of earnings forecasts by management in the IPO
prospectuses are limited mainly to commonwealth countries due to the
lack of such forecasts in other markets. This could be due to the fact that
making a specific quantitative forecast in some countries may entail
risks that could be costly (US and Canada) and that forecasts are
voluntary (Australia, Canada, Denmark, UK and Hong Kong). Greece
is one of the few countries where the management of the IPOs is
required to disclose profit forecasts in their prospectuses.
In this study the forecast accuracy is measured for 208 companies
during the period 1994-2001. The results suggest that, on average,
managers’ understate earnings by 8.04 percent (median of 2.12%) while
the mean absolute forecast error is 42.82 percent (median of 36.55%).
The small difference between mean and median values indicates a small
positive skew in the distribution of 0.80 for FE and 1.97 for AFE.
Outliers had a major impact on FE. The elimination of these outliers
decreases the FE to 3.91%. Descriptive statistics reveal that the forecast
error is not normally distributed.
Cross-sectional regression equations are used to model absolute
forecast error and forecast superiority. AFE in Greece is associated with
the age of the firm, suggesting that IPOs with little operating history
experience higher forecast error. Similarly, industrial categorised firms
are associated with a higher level of forecast accuracy. Our results
provide no support for size, forecast horizon, underwriter reputation and
economic conditions.
This study also focused upon the superiority of management in
forecasting profits relative to the actual change in profits. Positive value
for SUP means that the Greek IPO profit forecast is more accurate than
a forecast based on the random walk model. Overall, the results reveal
that three factors – age of the firm, retained ownership and industry
variables – have statistical significance with the superiority factor.
The study finds that reported profits exceed their forecast profits,
and the result contradicts international evidence that management of
IPOs is typically overoptimistic in earnings forecasts. The main reason
is that Greek managers feel too weak and inexperienced to predict the
earnings behaviour of their firms in the market, so, in this case, they
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prefer to report conservative earnings forecasts that ultimately prove to
be much less when compared with the actual profit, than an optimistic
earning forecast that will not be verified by the actual results.
Additionally, managers are scared of providing an optimistic view, as
they fear their investor critics in the future, which could possibly
detrimentally affect their firms.
The first-day return of our sample obtaining a mean (adjusted)
underpricing equal to 41.85% (42.67%). It verified that underpricing is
particularly high during ‘hot issue’ markets, and has been decreasing
during the late 2000 and whole 2001. The findings run consistently to
US evidence, where IPOs have been more heavily underpriced in 1998,
1999 and 2000 than in previous years. Yet, the comparison between the
two markets reveals that both experienced the tech bubble of
Technology Company. This suggests that similar to US in Greece the
huge level of IPO underpricing in 1999 and 2000 was partly due to
technology stocks. Moreover, it was verified that the pricing process is
affected by several other determinants as the size of the firm, their
leverage and the economic conditions of the market.
The findings of this study have serious implications to investors,
shareholders and policy makers. First, investors should closely look the
earnings prediction in the prospectus before they will reach their final
decision as the way earnings forecast information is disclosed in IPO
prospectuses is of great importance. Wrong decisions by both investors
and shareholders – if they will keep position - may be costly especially
in the long term. Second, as we document medium absolute forecast
error in this study, it appears there is window for improvement by the
policy makers’ side. The mandatory status which forces any firm to
provide earnings forecast in the prospectus no matter of their ability
shows that disclosure of earnings forecast information without penalty
can lead to unreliable forecasts. This result reinforces the role of
voluntary financial disclosures as a means to reduce information
asymmetry. This study could have implications for stock market
regulators, as it suggests that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts
may deteriorate the efficiency of the markets by increasing forecast
error.
Emphasis should continue to be placed upon research into the
variables of prospectus forecast accuracy. Even if the contributions
today have been instructive, none have provided substantial
explanations. However we proposed two interesting aspects for further
consideration, which will help to improve collective knowledge on the
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subject. Initially, we need to investigate whether managers take action
to improve accuracy by managing reported profits. Second, as the
regulation for mandatory disclosure of forecast earnings has changed in
Greece in favor of voluntary disclosure, it will be interesting to provide
the first comparative study on an international level for the same
market.
Accepted by:   Prof. P. Theodossiou, Editor-in-Chief, February 2010 
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